The Impact of the Capital Markets on Real Estate Law and Practice by Schill, Michael H.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
1999
The Impact of the Capital Markets on Real Estate
Law and Practice
Michael H. Schill
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael H. Schill, "The Impact of the Capital Markets on Real Estate Law and Practice," 32 John Marshall Law Review 269 (1999).
THE IMPACT OF THE CAPITAL MARKETS
ON REAL ESTATE LAW AND PRACTICE
MICHAEL H. SCHILL*
Over the past twenty years, the real estate markets of the
United States have been swept by enormous change. A sector of the
economy that had long been resistant to change, real estate has
been and is continuing to be transformed by the process of securi-
tization on both the debt and equity side. Just twenty years ago,
the vast majority of single family residential mortgage loans were
provided by local banks or savings and loan associations that held
the debt in their portfolios until maturity or prepayment. Today,
most single family mortgage debt is sold into the secondary mort-
gage market and converted into securities. Ten years ago, mort-
gage loans for commercial properties were largely originated and
held by commercial banks, pension funds or insurance companies.
In recent years, with the exception of the meltdown of the commer-
cial mortgage-backed securities market in the summer of 1998, the
proportion of commercial loans that were securitized rapidly grew.
Just six or seven years ago, real estate investment trusts (REITs)
were commonly thought of as the investment entity that crashed
and burned in the 1970s. In the last two or three years, however,
REITs have increasingly come to be seen as a dominant, if not pre-
eminent ownership vehicle in many real estate markets throughout
the nation.
In this article, I describe how capital markets have changed the
real estate industry and provide data which illustrate how impres-
sive the growth of securitization of debt and equity have been. I
also describe competing theories about what the growth of real es-
tate capital markets might mean for the future of the industry. In
many ways, the forces that have transformed the way real estate is
bought, sold and financed have also dramatically changed the way
real estate law is practiced in the United States. However, the
black letter law of real estate (i.e., statutes and common law) has
* Professor of Law and Urban Planning, New York University and Direc-
tor, New York University School of Law Center For Real Estate and Urban
Policy. The author would like to thank Mark Eagan of Kirkland and Ellis, Jo-
seph Forte of Thacher Proffitt and Wood, Donald Glascoff of Cadwalader, Wick-
ersham and Taft and Alan Pomerantz of Weil, Gotshal and Manges for their
helpful comments and advice. The research assistance of David Kraut is also
gratefully acknowledged. This article is based upon a lecture given by the au-
thor as part of the Robert Kratovil Memorial Seminar in Real Estate Law held
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remained rather static. I conclude by discussing why the black let-
ter law of real estate has been resistant to change and what the
chances are for transformation in the future.
THE GROWTH OF DEBT SECURITIZATION IN REAL ESTATE
- The securitization of real estate debt has roots that stretch
back to the Great Depression. At the time, mortgage loans were
typically originated by local banks and had short terms.1 Origina-
tors typically held these mortgages until maturity. In 1934, during
the Depression, the federal government created the Federal Hous-
ing Administration (FHA) to induce thrift institutions to originate
long-term loans with relatively low down-payments. The FHA's
main function was to insure lenders against the risk of default. 2
To provide greater liquidity for these loans, the federal govern-
ment also created the first secondary mortgage market agency- the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)- whose mis-
sion was to buy and sell federally insured mortgages. 3 In 1968,
another secondary mortgage market agency called the Government
National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) was created to take
over the low income housing programs previously run by Fannie
Mae.4 Fannie Mae was then restructured as a private corporation
with ties to the federal government. 5 Fannie Mae was also given
the authority to buy and sell conventional (non-federally insured)
home mortgage loans.6
In 1970, Congress established the third major secondary mort-
gage market agency- the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora-
tion (Freddie Mac). 7  Like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac was
empowered to buy and sell conventional loans.8 In the 1970s, the
secondary mortgage market agencies became instrumental in pro-
moting the growth of securitization. Issuers of mortgage-backed se-
curities pool hundreds of loans together, obtain credit
enhancement, usually in the form of guarantees, from a secondary
market agency and sell their interests in the pool of mortgages to
investors.
1. Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Fi-
nance Law in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets,
64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1263-64 (1991).
2. Id. at 1264.
3. C. EDSON & B. JACOBS, SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET GUIDE § 5.01, at
5-3 (1990).
4. See 12 U.S.C. § 1716b (1989).
5. Schill, supra note 1, at 1267.
6. Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, § 201, 84
Stat. 450, 450-51 (1971) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1717 (1970)).
7. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-351,
§ 301-10, 84 Stat. 451 (1970).
8. Schill, supra note 1, at 1267 & n.27.
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The first generation of mortgage-backed securities were pass-
through certificates that entitled the holders to a proportionate
share of interest and principal as these amounts were paid by mort-
gagors. 9 Recognizing that investors have varying time horizons
and tolerances for risk, issuers of mortgage-backed securities sub-
sequently divided the flow of mortgage interest and principal from
the pool to create debt instruments of varying maturities and levels
of risk. These mortgage-backed securities were initially structured
as collateralized mortgage obligations and then, after the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, as Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits or
REMICs.10
The growth of residential mortgage-backed securities has been
phenomenal. As Figure 1 indicates, in 1984, the three secondary
mortgage market agencies together issued $58.6 billion in pass-
through securities backed by one-to-four family home conventional
mortgages."1 This annual level of origination grew to a peak of over
$550 billion in 1993.12 In 1997, total issuance by the agencies was
358.3 billion, constituting more than a 500% increase over the thir-
teen year period. i3
The growth of securities backed by mortgage loans on one-to-
four family homes as a proportion of all mortgage debt outstanding
is even more impressive. As shown in Figure 2, in 1984, $1.3 tril-
lion of debt secured by mortgages on one-to-four family homes was
outstanding.14 Of this total debt outstanding, only $303.6 billion or
23% was securitized. i 5 By the end of the first quarter of 1998, the
total debt outstanding had grown to $4.1 trillion, $2.1 trillion or
52% of which had been securitized.' 6 Indeed, in 1997, 56.6% of all
newly originated home mortgage loans found their way into the
mortgage-backed securities market.' 7
9. Id. at 1270.
10. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 860A-860G (1994) (defining real estate mortgage in-
vestment conduit (REMIC) as a type of mortgage-backed security in which the
interest paid by the borrower escapes taxation at the entity level).
11. 14 SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKETS: MORTGAGE MARKET TRENDS 1997,
July 1997, at 47 tbl.A-8.
12. Id.
13. Communication to the author from Freddie Mac (October 2, 1998).
14. Mortgage Debt Outstanding, 73 FED. RESERVE BULL. A39 tbl.1.54 (June
1987).
15. Id.
16. Mortgage Debt Outstanding, 84 FED. RESERVE BULL. A35 tbl.1.54 (Aug.
1998).
17. Id.
19991
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FIGURE 2
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES AND
ALL OUTSTANDING MORTGAGE DEBT ON 1-4 FAMILY HOMES
(1984-1998)
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As the securitization of home mortgage loans exploded in the
1980s, the commercial mortgage debt market was much slower to
join the securitization bandwagon. A number of factors accounted
for the relatively slow growth of commercial mortgage-backed se-
curities during this period. Perhaps most importantly, no secon-
dary mortgage market for commercial mortgage loans was created
by the federal government. Thus, the secondary mortgage market
for commercial mortgages had to be created in a piecemeal fashion
by a variety of institutional investors and Wall Street. In addition,
certain characteristics of commercial mortgages made them a bit
more difficult to securitize. Commercial mortgage loans tend to be
much larger than residential loans. Therefore, the number of loans
1999]
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in a pool tends to be smaller, creating greater risk due to less oppor-
tunity for diversification.
Commercial mortgage loans are also more idiosyncratic than
residential loans. Commercial properties are typically quite differ-
ent from each other, requiring much more due diligence than pools
based upon relatively similar single family loans. Moreover, the
loan documentation for commercial properties tends to be much
more voluminous and non-uniform as compared to residential
properties. Finally, without a secondary mortgage market backed
by federal or quasi-federal guarantees, the commercial mortgage-
backed securities market required experimentation with different
methods of credit enhancement such as letters of credit and
overcollateralization.
Nevertheless, throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, the com-
mercial mortgage-backed securities market grew significantly. As
Figure 3 indicates, in 1991, $4.3 billion in commercial mortgage-
backed securities were issued.18 This volume of issuance increased
by 850% to $41.0 billion in 1997.19 As a proportion of outstanding
commercial mortgage debt, the growth in number of commercial
mortgage-backed securities has also been strong. According to Fig-
ure 4, in 1990, $758 billion of mortgages secured by commercial
properties were outstanding of which less than $5 billion had been
securitized. 20 By the first quarter of 1998, $855 billion of commer-
cial mortgages were outstanding and over $102 billion had been
securitized (a 20-fold increase). 2 1
As compared to residential mortgages, commercial mortgage-
backed securities have a way to go. The absolute volume of one-to-
four family loans that have been securitized is much greater than
that for commercial loans.22 Although as a proportion of mortgage
debt outstanding, the residential mortgage-backed securities mar-
ket far exceeds the proportion of commercial mortgage-backed se-
curities, the rate of growth for commercial mortgage-backed
securities is much steeper. 23
18. THE MORTGAGE MARKET STATISTICAL ANNUAL FOR 1998, 409 (1998).
19. Id.
20. Mortgage Debt Outstanding, 80 FED. RESERVE BULL. A38 tbl.1.54 (June
1994).
21. Mortgage Debt Outstanding, supra note 16, at A35 tbl.1.54.
22. Id. Mortgage Debt Outstanding, supra note 20, at A38 tbl.1.54.
23. Mortgage Debt Outstanding, supra note 16, at A35 tbl.1.54.
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FIGURE 4
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUTSTANDING MORTGAGE-BACKED
SECURITIES AND ALL OUTSTANDING MORTGAGE DEBT ON
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES (1990-1997)
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THE SECURITIZATION OF EQUITY IN REAL ESTATE
Just as the capital markets have dramatically affected the debt
structure of real estate, they have also had a tremendous impact on
equity. In recent years, REITs have taken the real estate market
by storm. A REIT is typically formed as a corporation or trust
under state law. To qualify as a REIT under the Internal Revenue
Code, the REIT must meet a long list of requirements concerning
its investments and beneficial owners. Most important, a REIT
must distribute 95% of its net earnings each year to its owners in
the form of dividends.24 Failure to do this will result in financial
penalties or loss of its status under the tax law.25 As long as a
REIT adheres to these requirements, it will be subject to only one
layer of taxation, a distinct advantage over organizing as a corpora-
24. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 856-859 (1988).
25. See id. §§ 856-859.
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tion. Like a corporation, however, the beneficial owners of the
REIT are insulated from liability. In addition the REIT is an ex-
tremely liquid investment vehicle with shares of many REITs trad-
ing freely in the stock market.
REITs are not a new invention. In the late 1960s and early
1970s, REITs grew rapidly. Unlike today, the majority of REIT as-
sets were in land and construction loans rather than in equity in-
terests in real estate. 2 6 Mortgage REITs typically borrowed short-
term to finance these loans and were caught as market interest
rates rapidly increased in the early 1970s. 2 7 As a result, many
REITs failed during this period and it has taken over a decade for
the industry to rebound. 28
The current resurgence of REITs began in the 1980s with the
growth of equity REITs and took off during the early 1990s. 29 This
corresponds to the period following the slump in real estate that
occurred during the recession of 1989-1991. During this period,
traditional sources of real estate capital dried up as banks, pension
funds and life insurance companies overreacted to the lax credit
standards and losses of the 1980s and early 1990s. The REIT be-
came a way for real estate to amass capital as the nation emerged
from the recession. Indeed, as depicted in Figure 5, the number of
equity REITs rose from 25 in 1984 to 176 in 1997, a 600% in-
crease. 30 In addition, the capitalization of REITs (defined as the
price of shares multiplied by the number of shares outstanding)
shot up by an astounding factor of 55, increasing from $2.3 billion
in 1984 to $127.8 billion in 1997.31
26. Barry Ziering et al., The Evolution of Public and Private Market Invest-
ing in the New Real Estate Capital Markets, 14 REAL EST. FIN. 22 (1997).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, Annual Market
Capitalization Table (visited Jan. 28, 1999) <http://www.nareit.com/faxondem/
211.html>.
30. Id.
31. Id.
1999]
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According to the estimates of one real estate analyst set forth
in Figure 6, as of June 30, 1997, REITs accounted for over one-third
(35.2%) of all institutional real estate in the United States.3 2 Only
pension funds had a greater share (39.4%) of equity interests in the
sector.
FIGURE 6
INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY INVESTMENT IN REAL ESTATE (1997)
(DOLLARS IN BILLIONS)
Life Companies
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Source: ERE Yarmouth Investment Research
REITs invest in a variety of real estate.33 As Figure 7 shows,
in 1997, the largest proportion (25.9%) of REIT capitalization was
invested in industrial and office buildings.34 The third largest sec-
tor invested in was apartment buildings (17.7%). 3 5
FIGURE 7
REIT CAPITALIZATION BY PROPERTY TYPE (1997)
Industrial/Office Residential
25.90% 17.66%
.. Lodging/Resorts
10.25%
Mortgage Backed
5.15%
Source: ERE Yarmouth Investment Research
32. ERE YARMOUTH AND REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION, EMERGING
TRENDS IN REAL ESTATE 1998 (1998), available in (last modified July 10, 1998)
<http://www.208.240.92.174/rsch/trends1998/index.htm>.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
1999]
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THE IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITIZATION OF DEBT AND EQUITY FOR
THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY
Despite the disruptions of 1998,36 the capital markets have had
and will continue to have a tremendous impact on the nation's real
estate industry. Indeed, the federal government fostered securi-
tization of the single family mortgage market to achieve a number
of public policy objectives. Prior to the creation of an effective sec-
ondary mortgage market and securitization, capital flows through-
out the United States were not uniform. During this period of
segmented markets, capital shortages periodically developed in fast
growing areas where the funds deposited in local banks were out-
stripped by demand. In other parts of the country, surpluses in
capital existed. 37
The growth of the secondary mortgage market and securitiza-
tion evened out the flow of capital in the nation. Financial institu-
tions became increasingly willing to originate home loans when
they knew that a secondary mortgage market agency such as Fan-
nie Mae or Freddie Mac stood ready to purchase them. The secon-
dary mortgage market enabled investors in one part of the country
to invest in mortgages originated in another region, effectively end-
ing the geographic segmentation of credit.
The growth in the supply of capital had the beneficial impact of
reducing mortgage interest rates.38 In addition, securitization, by
tying real estate credit markets to the nation's general capital mar-
kets, increased the total amount of capital flowing into real estate.
Institutional investors who would have stayed away from investing
in whole mortgages due to the risk of default and high information
and transaction costs, were much more likely to purchase credit-
enhanced multi-class mortgage-backed securities that resembled
corporate bonds. Although the growth of commercial mortgage-
backed securities has been slower than for residential mortgages,
the same types of effects are likely to occur-increased liquidity and
lower costs of credit.
The growth of REITs has also had a major impact on the face of
the real estate industry. Real estate has always been an area that
was the province of the individual entrepreneur. The growth of
REITs and their apparent willingness in many markets to bid up
the prices of real estate promises to reduce the dominance of indi-
36. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
37. Schill, supra note 1, at 1267-71.
38. See, e.g., Patric H. Hendershott & James D. Shilling, The Impact of the
Agencies on Conventional Fixed-Rate Mortgage Yields, 2 J. REAL EST. FIN. &
ECON. 101 (1989) (finding that interest rates on loans that did not qualify for
purchase by secondary mortgage market agencies had interest rates that were
15 to 30 basis points higher than loans that did).
[32:269
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vidual entrepreneurs and increase the role of technocrats in real
estate.
The long lasting impact of the securitization of debt and equity
in real estate on the industry and on real estate cycles is also a
subject of much debate. According to one view associated with Sam
Zell, Chairman of Equity Residential Properties Trust,3 9 the grow-
ing influence of Wall Street in real estate is positive and will lead to
increasing market discipline, a consolidation of the industry, its
professionalizaton and a dampening of real estate cycles. 40 One ef-
fect of the growth of public capital markets in real estate has been
the explosion of information about real estate. No longer can prop-
erty-specific information on property characteristics, returns or de-
fault rates be kept proprietary. This information, which must be
disclosed under federal securities laws, together with the creation
of sophisticated econometric models to estimate returns, has im-
proved the ability of market participants to analyze current condi-
tions and forecast the future.4 '
In addition, the growth of information and requirements for its
disclosure provide signals for capital providers about which firms
are best run.4 2 Capital will flow to firms with the highest rates of
return and away from less efficient owners and developers.4 3 The
growing influence of rating agencies will further reward efficient
firms with a lower cost of capital.44 Over time, better run firms
with an ability to reap economies of scale will take over less compet-
itive firms.
According to one analyst, Peter Linneman, the consolidation of
the real estate industry will also dampen the cyclical nature of real
estate. 4 5 These cycles are typically created by oversupply.4 6 Ac-
cording to Linneman, fewer market actors will make each company
more aware of its impact on the marketplace and enable them to
respond better to changing market conditions.47
39. This view is spelled out in detail in three articles appearing in the
Wharton Real Estate Review, a journal published by the Samuel Zell and Rob-
ert Lurie Real Estate Center of the University of Pennsylvania. See Douglas
Crocker II, Inside the Revolution, WHARTON REAL EST. REV., Fall 1998, at 28;
Peter Linneman, Forces Changing the Real Estate Industry Forever, WHARTON
REAL EST. REV., Spring 1997, at 11-12; Samuel Zell, Liquid Real Estate, WHAR-
TON REAL EST. REV., Fall 1997, at 44, 45.
40. Linneman, supra note 39, at 11-12; Zell, supra note 39, at 44-45.
41. Linneman, supra note 39, at 11-12.
42. Zell, supra note 39, at 44-45.
43. Id.
44. Linneman, supra note 39, at 5.
45. Id. at 11-12.
46. Peter Linneman, (When) Will We Do It Again?, WHARTON REAL EST.
REV., Spring 1998, at 30-31.
47. Linneman, supra note 39, at 12.
1999]
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The view that the growing influence of capital markets on real
estate will inevitably lead to consolidation and a more disciplined
market has been criticized on several fronts. A number of commen-
tators have suggested that REITs face pressures to grow in order to
increase their price-dividend multiples. 48 This growth imperative
may cause them either to over-pay for properties or to support new
development in markets that are close to saturation.49 Indeed, one
recent empirical study reports that REITs do not exhibit the econo-
mies of scale asserted by their proponents. 50
Some analysts also question whether security holders and rat-
ings agencies will appropriately monitor real estate markets.5 1 In-
vestors may lack information about local real estate conditions. 52
In addition, because REITs typically operate in a number of juris-
dictions, investor monitoring may not be able to deter overbuilding
in certain locales. 5 3 The local nature of real estate markets may
also be a disadvantage for REITs as they grow bigger and operate
in more markets.54 REIT managers may lack in depth knowledge
and familiarity with the markets in which they operate. 55 Further-
more, some have argued that reliance on rating agencies may be
misplaced because they must compete for the business of issuers.5 6
Anthony Downs has also suggested that the growth and consol-
idation of REITs might have a negative long range impact on the
underlying assets. In their efforts to increase current earnings and
drive up share prices, REIT managers may take more of a short-run
perspective than the traditional real estate entrepreneur who fre-
quently planned to hold onto properties and transmit them to his
children. 57 Furthermore, since REITs must distribute 95% of their
annual earnings or face stiff penalties, they cannot retain earnings
48. See, e.g., Anthony Downs, The Pressures on Public REITs to Grow
Larger, WHARTON REAL EST. REV., Fall 1997, at 3-7.
49. Id. at 13.
50. See Brent Ambrose et al., REIT Economies of Scale: Fact or Fiction? 9
(Dec. 18, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding that econ-
omies of scale did not exist for larger REITs). See also John H. Vogel Jr., Why
The New Conventional Wisdom About REITs is Wrong, REAL EST. FIN., 7, 7-8
(1997) (observing that little evidence exists to demonstrate economies of scale
in REITs). But see Brent Ambrose & Peter Linneman, Organizational Struc-
ture and REIT Operating Characteristics 10 (Nov. 19, 1998) (unpublished man-
uscript, on file with author) (finding that larger REITs have higher profit
margins and rental revenue ratios, but not lower expense ratios).
51. Ambrose & Linneman, supra note 50, at 6; see also Sally Gordon, Real
Estate Capital Markets: Who's the Daddy?, REAL EST. FIN. J., Summer 1998, at
6-7.
52. Downs, supra note 48, at 6.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 9; see also Gordon, supra note 51, at 9-10.
55. Downs, supra note 48, at 9.
56. Gordon, supra note 51, at 12.
57. Downs, supra note 48, at 14.
[32:269
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to the extent that other investors can.58 Consequently, they may
have fewer resources to ride out bad market conditions and may put
off capital improvements during these periods.59
Only time will tell whether the changes we are experiencing
will sound the death knell for small real estate entrepreneurs and
some of our more famous family dynasties. 60 In addition, only a
recession or two will tell us whether the securitization of debt and
equity has dampened the cyclical nature of real estate. One bit of
anecdotal information might suggest that there is something to
these theories. As spreads on mortgage-backed securities tightened
over the summer of 1998, CS First Boston, one of the more aggres-
sive lenders in the New York area, pulled the plug on certain mort-
gage loans it was going to make.61 Shortly thereafter, one of the
leading issuers of commercial mortgage-backed securities, Capital
Company of America, a subsidiary of Nomura, announced that it
would abandon the business.62 This rather quick reaction to chang-
ing market conditions stands in marked contrast to the behavior of
financial institutions ten years ago and may suggest greater disci-
pline in the market. Although the problems in the commercial
mortgage-backed securities market and the large drop in the share
prices of REITs in the summer of 1998 may have been a reflection of
an efficient new market structure, they may, alternatively, have
been an overreaction to extrinsic economic conditions that have lit-
tle to do with real estate market fundamentals. 63
THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL MARKETS ON THE PRACTICE OF REAL
ESTATE LAW
Regardless of its ultimate impact on the structure of the real
estate industry, the growing securitization of real estate equity and
debt has already had a tremendous impact on the practice of real
estate law. As Wall Street makes itself felt in real estate, real es-
tate lawyers increasingly must master and apply legal principles
that used to be the province of lawyers from other departments.
58. Linneman, supra note 39, at 7.
59. Downs, supra note 48, at 3.
60. For an entertaining and informative history of the real estate families
of New York City, see TOM SHACHTMAN, SKYSCRAPER DREAMS: THE GREAT REAL
ESTATE DYNASTIES OF NEW YORK (1991).
61. Steve Bergsman, After the Fall, MORTGAGE BANKING, Nov. 1998, at 52;
Peter Slatin, The Ground Floor, BARRON'S, Sept. 14, 1998, at 62.
62. See Joseph Kahn, Nomura Subsidiary in U.S. Ending Real Estate Ven-
ture, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1998, at C5.
63. There was some indication by the end of 1998 that the commercial mort-
gage-backed securities market was on the road to recovery. See Steve
Bergsman, Searching For A New Balance: In the Past 12 Months, Wall Street's
Role in Real Estate Finance Has Boomed, Gone Bust, and May be Showing
Signs of Life Again, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIG., Dec. 7, 1998; CMBS Market
Back On The Good Foot, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES LETTER, Nov. 23, 1998.
1999]
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Among the many new areas real estate lawyers must understand
are the disclosure requirements mandated by federal securities
laws, the practices and requirements of ratings agencies, how to
structure deals in entities that are bankruptcy-remote, and how to
advise REIT clients to structure transactions so as to preserve their
favorable tax treatment.
In addition to mastering and applying the principles that used
to be the province of lawyers from different departments, the prac-
tice of real estate law itself has changed. For example, in real es-
tate financing transactions, the days when every firm had its own
idiosyncratic forms for mortgage transactions are rapidly coming to
an end. The use of relatively standard documents and deal struc-
tures first became commonplace in single family home mortgage
transactions. Indeed, with respect to mortgages on single family
homes, most lawyers have typically given up trying to get origina-
tors to accept provisions that vary from the Fannie Mae or Freddie
Mac forms because such provisions would make the loans unsale-
able in the secondary mortgage market.
This rigidity over terms is also beginning to find its way into
commercial mortgages. More often the requirements of the rating
agencies are dictating the form and content of commercial mort-
gages. To veer away from these requirements could potentially cost
the issuer of mortgage-backed securities an investment grade and
thereby have an adverse impact on returns.
Indeed, in 1996, the Capital Consortium, a joint effort of the
National Realty Committee, the Mortgage Bankers Association and
the National Realtors Association, did the heretofore unthinkable
by issuing model mortgage forms to be used in commercial mort-
gage transactions. 6 4 The forms contain a number of provisions that
are designed to make the mortgage loan acceptable to rating agen-
cies. 65 Among the provisions that vary most from those used in
many mortgages are: 1) absolute prohibitions on secondary financ-
ing;6 6 2) single-purpose entity/bankruptcy remote covenants; 67 3)
extensive covenants to provide information about the property; 68
and 4) requirements to use proceeds from casualty or condemnation
awards for restoration. 69 The forms have not caused lawyers to en-
tirely abandon their idiosyncratic forms or favorite representations
64. See THE CAPITAL CONSORTIUM, CAPITAL MARKETS INITIATIVES, June 25,
1996, at 15-57. For a description of the Capital Consortium's proposed mort-
gage forms see Joseph Philip Forte, A Capital Markets Mortgage: A Ratable
Model For Main Street and Wall Street, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 489
(1996).
65. See THE CAPITAL CONSORTIUM, supra note 64, at 15-57.
66. Id. at 38.
67. Id. at 27.
68. Id. at 25-6.
69. Id. at 22-3.
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or warranties. However, they have formed the basis for greater
uniformity of terms in commercial lending transactions.
THE IMPACT OF THE CAPITAL MARKETS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW
OF REAL ESTATE
Although there can be no doubt that the securitization of real
estate debt and equity has changed the form of real estate transac-
tions as well as the way real estate lawyers practice their profes-
sion, the same cannot be said for the underlying substantive law of
real estate. For years, commentators have argued that the linkage
of real estate markets to national securities markets would mark
the end of the divergent legal rules that apply from state to state,
governing much including conveyancing practices, title and the law
of mortgage foreclosure. 70 According to these arguments, idiosyn-
cratic state real estate laws would add transaction costs to increas-
ingly interstate transactions concerning real estate.7 ' The
successful linkage of real estate credit and equity markets to na-
tional capital markets would therefore create incentives for elimi-
nating differences among the states.72
The growth of the national capital markets for real estate has
been used to justify the adoption of uniform laws. However, the
track record among states in voluntarily adopting the uniform laws
promulgated by the National Commissioners on Uniform Laws has
been dismal. 73 The Uniform Land Transaction Act (ULTA) was not
adopted by a single state.7 4 Efforts to carve out the Uniform Land
Security Interest Act (ULSIA) similarly failed to succeed. 75 In light
of the overwhelming success of the Uniform Commercial Code, the
resistance of states to uniform real estate laws has puzzled both the
advocates of uniform laws as well as many academic com-
mentators.
76
Uniformity was forced on states, however, in certain instances
by the federal government. Among the notable legislation was Con-
gress's passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
70. Robin P. Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market - A Catalyst for
Change in Real Estate Transactions, 39 Sw. L.J. 991, 991-92 (1986).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., The Future of American Real Estate Law: Uni-
form Foreclosure Laws and Uniform Land Security Interest Act, 20 NOVA L.
REV. 1109, 1128 (1996).
74. See Ronald Benton Brown, Whatever Happened to ULTA?, 20 NOVA L.
REV. 1017, 1018 (1996).
75. Randolph, supra note 73, at 1128.
76. See 20 NOVA L. REV. 1017 (1996) (a recent volume of the Nova Law Re-
view devoted to a symposium entitled, "Whatever Happened to the Uniform
Land Transactions Act?").
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Monetary Control Act of 1980,77 which preempted state anti-usury
laws on loans secured by first mortgages on residential properties;
the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982,78 which
preempted state laws limiting the right of lenders to enforce due-
on-sale clauses in mortgages; and two statutes in 1981 and 1994
substituting a federal law of mortgage foreclosure for mortgages
held by the federal government. 79
In 1991, I wrote two law review articles that addressed both
the prospects for uniform law as well as the wisdom of federal pre-
emption.8 0 My view then as well as today is that the case for uni-
form laws governing real estate foreclosure and borrower
protections has not yet been convincingly made by proponents. s ' In
addition, even if I were convinced that uniform laws were desirable,
I believe that we would be well advised to let market forces create
the pressure for change rather than have the federal government
step in and preempt state law.
Briefly, I argued that non-uniform mortgagor protection laws
in the context of residential real estate were likely to generate only
modest costs.8 2 I supported this argument by estimating the effect
of anti-deficiency judgment laws and statutory rights of redemption
on interest rates.8 3 I found that the effect of anti-deficiency laws
was statistically insignificant and that an eleven month statutory
right of redemption was associated with an increase in interest of
only seven basis points.8 4 I further simulated a variety of costs for
foreclosure and the expected delays attributable to these laws and
found that their impact on interest rates was likely minimal.8 5
I took this information about low costs and speculated that the
benefits of these non-uniform mortgagor protections might conceiv-
ably exceed their costs, particularly for risk-averse borrowers.8 6 I
also concluded that the demand for these laws might vary among
states either because of geographic variations in real estate cycles
or differences in political culture. s 7 Furthermore, even if the laws
-77. Pub. L. No. 96-221, tit. V, § 501(a)(1), 94 Stat. 132, 161 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (1980)).
78. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
79. See Multifamily Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
§§ 361-3691, 95 Stat. 422, 422-31 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. §§ 3701-17
(1988)); Single Family Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1994, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3751-68
(1994).
80. Schill, supra note 1; see also Michael Schill, An Economic Analysis of
Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REv. 498 (1991).
81. Schill, supra note 1, at 1262.
82. Schill, supra note 80, at 512-14.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 523.
87. Schill, supra note 1, at 1299-1304.
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were costly and inefficient, there was no reason for the federal gov-
ernment to supplant the judgment of the citizens of states that had
these laws, at least in the absence of significant externalities.8 8
Today, my views essentially remain the same. The exponential
growth of REITs and mortgage-backed securities despite the persis-
tence of these non-uniform laws suggests to me that they are not
major impediments to the capital markets. Nevertheless, the
growth of the market for commercial mortgage-backed securities
probably increases the likelihood that these laws will gradually be
forced out by competitive forces. With respect to home mortgage
loans, to the extent that non-uniform laws generate costs, it is
likely that these costs are not entirely borne by citizens of the states
that enacted them, but instead a portion of the costs are likely to be
externalized. Externalities result because Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac do not price loans differentially to account for the risk of state
laws. It is unclear why they do not do this since information and
technology exists that would permit the practice. One possibility is
that the costs of the non-uniform laws are so low that the cost to the
agencies of pricing the risk would exceed the benefits. Alternatively
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as quasi-federal agencies subject to
political forces and Congressional oversight may be wary of anger-
ing members of Congress from particular states. No similar polit-
ical impediment would exist to state-by-state pricing in the
commercial mortgage-backed securities market if such pricing were
efficient and would generate higher profits.
There is also some reason to believe that the costs of these
types of laws would be higher for commercial as compared to resi-
dential mortgage-backed securities and that the corresponding ben-
efits of the laws to borrowers might be lower. The size of an
individual residential loan or set of loans from a state with costly
borrower protection laws is likely to be insignificant when consid-
ered in the context of the entire pool of mortgages backing a partic-
ular issue of securities. As Professor Randolph correctly noted in a
recent article, however, the number of loans in a commercial mort-
gage-backed security pool is much smaller and any one loan is
likely to have a far greater impact.8 9 Therefore, if non-uniform
mortgage foreclosure laws were to raise costs significantly, they
would likely have a much bigger impact now than they would have
had before the recent growth of commercial mortgage-backed secur-
ities. In addition, rates of foreclosure for commercial mortgages are
typically higher than those for single family loans.90 Since non-
88. Id. at 1286-1318.
89. Randolph, supra note 73, at 1129.
90. See INSIDE MORTGAGE FINANCE PUBLICATIONS, THE MORTGAGE MARKET
STATISTICAL ANNUAL FOR 1998 422-23 (1998). In December 1996, the propor-
tion of commercial mortgage loans that were in the process of foreclosure
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uniform mortgage foreclosure and borrower protection laws gener-
ate costs only when foreclosure takes place, the costs are therefore
likely to be greater in the context of commercial mortgage-backed
securities.
Finally, the benefits of non-uniform mortgagor protection laws
are likely to be less for commercial as compared to residential bor-
rowers. Commercial borrowers are much more likely to be sophisti-
cated and risk neutral than are homebuyers. 91 In addition, they
typically are more diversified and better able to absorb the risk of
foreclosure.9 2 Although I am not making an argument that these
laws should be changed, I do believe that the forces that will likely
challenge their continued existence are probably stronger today
than at any time in our past.
CONCLUSION
In the future, real estate professionals are likely to experience
a world quite different from the one we have become accustomed to.
For investors, securitization of both debt and equity is likely to
make real estate more like other types of commodities and subject
to the same market pressures. For lawyers, the practice will never
be the same. Although significant changes in the substantive law of
real estate will likely be slow in coming, the practice of law has
already changed forever and will continue to evolve. The real es-
tate lawyer will have to add securities law, corporate law and bank-
ruptcy law to his or her repertoire. Now more than ever, the term
"dirt law" is a misnomer for the profession.
(1.10%) was higher than the proportion of all one to four family home loans in
foreclosure (0.91%). Id. The disparity between the two types of loans was sub-
stantially greater in 1995 and 1994 when foreclosure rates for commercial were
almost twice those of residential mortgage loans.
91. Schill, supra note 80, at 533-34.
92. Id. (highlighting the economic differences between commercial and sin-
gle family home borrowers reflected in the laws of several states that limit bor-
rower protections such as statutory rights of redemption or anti-deficiency
judgment rules to the latter group).
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